Unconditional Security of the Bennett 1992 quantum key-distribution over
  lossy and noisy channel by Tamaki, Kiyoshi & Lütkenhaus, Norbert
ar
X
iv
:q
ua
nt
-p
h/
03
08
04
8v
2 
 1
1 
A
ug
 2
00
3
Unconditional Security of the Bennett 1992 quantum key-distribution over lossy and
noisy channel
Kiyoshi Tamaki1∗ and Norbert Lu¨tkenhaus2
1The Graduate University for Advanced Studies (SOKENDAI), Hayama, Kanagawa, 240-0193, Japan,
2Institut fu¨r Theoretische Physik I, Universita¨t Erlangen-Nu¨rnberg, Staudtstr. 7/B3, 91058 Erlangen, Germany
We show that the security proof of the Bennett 1992 protocol over loss-free channel in (K. Tamaki,
M. Koashi, and N. Imoto, Phys. Rev. Lett. 90, 167904 (2003)) can be adapted to accommodate
loss. We assumed that Bob’s detectors discriminate between single photon states on one hand and
vacuum state or multi-photon states on the other hand.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.-a
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is one of the most
interesting topics in quantum information processing,
which allows the sender (Alice) and the receiver (Bob)
to share a secret key with negligibly leakage of informa-
tion to an eavesdropper (Eve). This task is accomplished
by making use of the properties of quantum mechan-
ics, such as no-cloning theorem [1], indistinguishability
of nonorthogonal quantum states, entanglement, and so
on [2]. The B92 protocol [3], where only two nonorthog-
onal states are used, is thought to be secure due to the
fact that Eve cannot clone and distinguish the states de-
terministically.
Although the qualitative reason of the security is sim-
ple, it is quite hard to show the quantitative security
against so-called coherent attack, which is the most gen-
eral attack allowed by quantum mechanics. In [4, 5], the
security of the BB84 protocol [6] is proven by showing
the relationship between QKD and other important pro-
tocols in quantum information, such as the entanglement
distillation protocol (EDP) [7] and the Calderbank-Shor-
Steane (CSS) quantum error correcting codes [8]. Re-
cently in [9], the unconditional security of the B92 pro-
tocol has been proved by relating the B92 protocol to
an entanglement distillation protocol (EDP) [7] initiated
by local filtering [10]. The assumptions of the proof are
that Alice and Bob’s devises are perfect and the quantum
channel is loss-free. To study the unconditional security
of B92 protocol over a lossy and noisy channel is inter-
esting from the point of view of the quantum information
theory, since the channel loss directly affects the security
of the B92 protocol. The proof based on the equivalence
between the security and EDPs gives us an idea how to
distill the EPR state from states that arise from the lossy
and noisy channel.
In this paper, we study the unconditional security of
the B92 protocol. We assume that Alice has a perfect
single photon source, Bob’s polarization measurement is
perfect and he has a perfect single photon counter that
∗Electronic address: tamaki˙kiyoshi@soken.ac.jp
discriminates between single photon states on one hand
and vacuum state or multi-photon states on the other
hand. Under these assumptions, we show the uncondi-
tional security of the B92 protocol. The proof follows the
idea in [9]. This paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II,
we propose the protocol based on EDP with local filter-
ing and CSS codes [5], and we reduce this to the B92
protocol. In Sec. III we give the formula for the error es-
timations for EDP based on CSS code. Finally, in Sec. IV
we give the examples of the resulting performance, and
the summary and discussion follow.
II. PROTOCOL BASED ON EDP AND ITS
REDUCTION TO THE B92 PROTOCOL
In this section, we introduce the protocol that will turn
out to be secure and will reduce to the B92 protocol. In
this protocol, Alice first prepares a two-qubit nonmaxi-
mally entangled states that can be written as
|Ψ〉AB = 1√
2
(|0z〉A|ϕ0〉B + |1z〉A|ϕ1〉B) (1)
and sends system B to Bob. Here |ϕj〉 ≡ β|0x〉 +
(−1)jα|1x〉, (j = 0, 1), where 0 < α < 1/
√
2, β ≡√
1− α2, and {|0x〉, |1x〉} is a basis (X-basis) of the qubit.
X-basis and Z-basis is related through the relationship
as |jz〉 = [|0x〉+ (−1)j |1x〉]/
√
2.
After receiving the state, Bob first performs the QND
measurements that can be described by the POVM (pos-
itive operator valued measure) [2]
Qs = Πs (2)
Qv = 1 −Πs (3)
where Πs is the projector onto the single photon space
and “v” means the detection of vacuum state or multi-
photon states. Thanks to this QND measurements, even
if Eve sends multi-photon states or vacuum state to Bob,
Alice and Bob can work only on the qubit pairs, provided
that the outcome is “s”. We also assume that, after this
measurement, if the outcome is “s”, Bob performs the
“local filtering operation” [10] on qubit B, described by
2the Kraus operator
Afil ≡ γ
β
(α|0x〉B〈0x|+ β|1x〉B〈1x|) , (4)
where γ ∈ (0, 1]. Note that if the channel is loss-
free and noiseless or Eve does nothing, this opera-
tion yields the maximally entangled state (EPR state)
(|0x〉A|0x〉B + |1x〉A|1x〉B)/
√
2 with probability 2α2γ2
due to the fact that the initial state is also written as
|Ψ〉AB = β|0x〉A|0x〉B + α|1x〉A|1x〉B. Thus, the filter-
ing operation with γ = 1 is optimum one in this case.
When channel is lossy and noisy, or Eve is present, the
filtered states may include bit errors, represented by
the subspace spanned by {|0z〉A|1z〉B, |1z〉A|0z〉B}, and
a phase error, represented by the subspace spanned by
{|0x〉A|1x〉B, |1x〉A|0x〉B}. In order to distill the EPR
pairs, Alice and Bob run the EDP based on CSS code [5]
and after this EDP Alice and Bob measure each in the
Z-basis of the EPR pairs so that they obtain a secure key.
Note that the QND measurement followed by the filter-
ing Afil and Z-basis measurement is equivalent to a mea-
surement ML,γB92 described by F γ0 = γ2|ϕ1〉〈ϕ1|/(2β2),
F γ1 = γ
2|ϕ0〉〈ϕ0|/(2β2), F γnull = Πs − F γ0 − F γ1 , and
Fv = 1−F γ0 −F γ1 −F γnull, where |ϕj〉 ≡ α|0x〉−(−1)jβ|1x〉.
ThusML,βB92 is the same measurement as in the B92 with
perfect photon detector, and ML,γB92 corresponds to the
generalized B92 protocol. For convenience, let MγB92 be
the measurements described by the set of the POVM ele-
ments {F γ0 , F γ1 , F γnull}. The following is the protocol that
we want to be shown secure and reduce to the generalized
B92 protocol.
Protocol: (1) Alice prepares the state |Ψ〉AB, and she
sends the system B to Bob over a quantum channel.
(2) Bob performs the QND measurement described by
{Qs, Qv}, and he publicly announces the outcome. They
take notes of the outcome. (3) Alice and Bob repeats the
step (1) and (2) 2N times. Let 2LN be the number of
outcomes that resulted in “v”. (4) Alice and Bob discard
all the pairs whose outcomes of the QND measurement
are “v”. By public discussion, Alice and Bob randomly
permute the positions of the remaining 2(1−L)N pairs.
(5) For the first (1−L)N pairs (check pairs), Alice mea-
sures system A in the Z-basis, and Bob performs mea-
surement MγB92 on his system. By public discussion,
they determine the number nerr of errors in which Al-
ice found 0 and Bob’s outcome was 1, or Alice found 1
with Bob’s outcome 0. (6) For the second (1−L)N pairs
(data pairs), Bob performs the filtering Afil on each of
his qubits, and announces the total number nfil and the
positions of the qubits that have passed the filtering. (7)
From L, nerr and nfil, they estimate an upper bound for
the number of bit errors nbit, and an upper bound for
the number of phase errors nph, in the nfil pairs. If these
bounds are too large, they abort the protocol. (8) They
run an EDP that can produce nkey nearly perfect EPR
pairs if the estimation is correct. (9) Alice and Bob each
measures the EPR pairs in Z-basis to obtain a shared
secret key.
In the following, we will reduce our protocol to the B92
protocol. Before this reduction, we should briefly men-
tion what Alice and Bob do experimentally in the B92
protocol. In the B92 protocol, Alice randomly prepares
the single photon polarization in the state |ϕ0〉 or |ϕ1〉
and sends the state to Bob. After receiving the state, Bob
performs measurement described byML,γB92. When γ = β
and Bob detects a single photon state, this measure-
ment effectively performs a polarization measurement on
the single photon state in a basis randomly chosen from
{|ϕ0〉, |ϕ0〉} and {|ϕ1〉, |ϕ1〉}. In the case where γ = 1
and Bob detects a single photon state, this measure-
ment effectively performs a general measurement which
describes the optimum unambiguous state discrimination
between |ϕ0〉 and |ϕ1〉 [11].
Thanks to Bob’s perfect detector, if the outcome of
the QND measurement is “s”, then Bob’s states are pro-
jected onto the single photon space. This projection re-
quires two more steps in our protocol compared to the
Protocol 1 in [9]. The benefit of this projection is that
for the states projected onto qubit-pairs Alice and Bob
can use the one-way EDP based on CSS code [5]. In the
context of QKD, this EDP allows Alice to perform Z-
basis measurements immediately after she has prepared
the state |Ψ〉AB and Bob to perform Z-basis measure-
ments immediately after he has performed the filtering.
Now Bob’s measurement is described by MγB92. Since
Bob performs the QND measurement before the mea-
surement MγB92, his measurement is equivalent to the
measurement ML,γB92. As a whole, the protocol has been
reduced into the protocol where Alice prepares and sends
|ϕ0〉 or |ϕ1〉 randomly and Bob performs theML,γB92 mea-
surement. This completes the reduction of our protocol
into the generalized B92 protocol over lossy and noisy
quantum channel.
Due to this equivalence, it is sufficient to prove the
security of the protocol for the security analysis of the
B92. The most important part in the quantitative secu-
rity analysis of our protocol is to estimate phase errors
and bit errors in the step (7). If this estimation is not ex-
ponentially reliable, then in the protocol Alice and Bob
cannot distill the state sufficiently close to EPR state so
that the protocol is not secure [4, 5]. In the next section,
we will give the formula to estimate the bit errors and
phase errors.
III. PHASE ERROR ESTIMATION FROM THE
BIT ERROR
In this section, we consider the error estimations in
the step (7) of the protocol. Thanks to Bob’s perfect
detector, the filtered states are qubit states, which allows
us to directly apply some inequalities from [9].
First, note that bit errors nbit in the data pairs could
be determined if Alice measures those pairs in Z-basis,
Bob performs measurement MγB92 onto those pairs, and
they compare their results. Thus, the bit error rate nerr
3in the check pairs and bit errors nbit in the data pairs
are determined by the same measurements. Furthermore
thanks to the random permutation in step (4), we can
apply the classical probability estimation so that we ob-
tain
|nbit − nerr| ≤ (1− L)Nǫ1. (5)
For any strategy by Eve, the probability of violating this
inequality is asymptotically less than exp
[−(1− L)Nǫ21].
Since the POVM elements that give the bit error rate
on the filtered states Πbit and phase error rate on the fil-
tered states Πph do not commute [12], the classical proba-
bility argument cannot be applied to the estimation of the
phase errors from the bit errors. For the estimation, let
us perform the gedanken measurements in the |ix〉A|j′x〉B
basis (i = 0, 1, j′ = 0, 1, v), and let the numbers nij′ of
the pairs found in the state |ix〉A|j′x〉B. Here we define
niv as the outcome where Alice obtains the bit value i
and Bob obtains vacuum or multi-photon states. As far
as we consider the measurement outcomes of the POVM
elements that are diagonal with respect to |ix〉A|j′x〉B ba-
sis, we are allowed to apply the classical argument for the
estimation. Thus, we have the following inequalities,∣∣∣∣α2(n00 + n10) + β2(n01 + n11)− β2γ2 nfil
∣∣∣∣ ≤ (1− L)Nǫ2(6)∣∣∣∣α2n10 + β2n01 − β2γ2 nph
∣∣∣∣ ≤ (1− L)Nǫ3,(7)
which are violated with probability asymptotically less
than exp
[−2(1− L)Nǫ22] and exp [−2(1− L)Nǫ23], re-
spectively. Similarly, since neither the noisy channel nor
Eve can touch the qubits held by Alice, we have
|α2N − (n10 + n11 + n1v)| ≤ Nǫ4 , (8)
with probability of violation asymptotically less than
exp(−2Nǫ24).
In order to represent the bit error in the check pairs in
terms of gedanken measurements, we introduce the global
gedanken measurements in the basis |Γij〉 (i = 0, 1, j =
0, 1) and the number of the corresponding measure-
ment outcomes mij , where |Γij〉 ≡ (−1)ijβ|ix〉A|jx〉B +
(−1)i(j+1)α|(i + 1)x〉A|(j + 1)x〉B. Here the summation
is taken modulo 2. Since the POVM element for the bit
error is diagonal with respect to the |Γij〉 basis [12], we
have ∣∣∣∣(m11 +m01)/2− β2γ2nerr
∣∣∣∣ ≤ (1− L)Nǫ5, (9)
which is violated with probability asymptotically less
than exp(−2(1− L)Nǫ25).
Since {|Γ01〉, |Γ10〉} and {|0x〉A|1x〉B, |1x〉A|0x〉B} span
the same subspace, we can relatem10+m01 and n10+n01
by the classical probability estimate as
|(m10 +m01)− (n10 + n01)| ≤ (1− L)Nǫ6, (10)
which is violated with probability asymptotically less
than exp
[−L(1− L)Nǫ26]. For the estimate of the phase
error rate in the data qubit from the bit error rate in
the check qubit, we need to relate m01/(m01 + m10)
to n01/(n01 + n10). This relation cannot be obtained
by classical arguments, since |Γ01〉 and |0x〉A|1x〉B are
nonorthogonal. In [9], the authors consider the qubits
that are invariant under the random permutation in the
limit of large number. Then they showed that when we
consider the measurement outcomes onto such qubits, we
are allowed to regard the qubits as if they arose from
the independently and identically distributed quantum
source. Their argument can be directly applied to our
case, since in step (4) of the protocol we have also ap-
plied the random permutation. Thus, we can make use
of the exponentially reliable inequality derived in [9] as
sin2(θl − θ)− ǫ7 ≤ sin2 φl ≤ sin2(θl + θ) + ǫ8 (11)
for l = 0, 1, where all the angles are defined in [0, π/2] by
the relations n11/(n11+n00) = sin
2 θ0, n01/(n01+n10) =
sin2 θ1, m11/(m11 +m00) = sin
2 φ0, m01/(m01 +m10) =
sin2 φ1, and α
2 = sin2 θ.
The Eqs. (5)–(11), together with the relation
∑
nij′ =
N and
∑
mij = (1 − L)N can be used to derive the
formula for the estimation of the phase error from bit
error. In the following we set ǫi → 0, (i = 1, 2, . . .8) by
taking the limit N → ∞ so that Eqs. (5)–(10) are now
linear equations.
We first consider the special case for the B92 where bit
error rate in the filtered qubits is zero while the phase
error rate in the qubits is not zero. Eve can accomplish
this by using channel loss. From nbit = 0, i.e., m11 =
m01 = 0, one can easily find that for nfil/N = 2α
2γ2(1−
L)
Max
(
nph
nfil
)

= α
2
β2−α2
L
1−L for L ≤ β2 − α2
≥ 1/2 for L > β2 − α2
. (12)
The limiting loss rate β2 − α2 coincides with the case
where Eve employs optimum unambiguous state discrim-
ination measurement [11]. In this attack, if she obtains
the conclusive outcome, then she sends the corresponding
state to Bob, otherwise she does not.
Next we consider the general case. The relationship
can be obtained by solving the equations that we have
mentioned just above. After straight forward calcula-
tions, we find the implicit constraint
β2
γ2
|nfil − 2nerr| ≤ Nαβf(x),
where
f(x) ≡
√
(x− L1)2 −
(
−∆+ L1
α2 − β2
)2
+
√
(1− x− L0)2 −
(
β2 − α2 −∆+ L0
α2 − β2
)2
4∆ ≡ [(β2/γ2)nfil/N − 2α2β2] /(β2 − α2)
x ≡ (β2/γ2) 2nph/N − (β2 − α2)∆
L0 ≡ α2n1v/N + β2n0v/N
L1 ≡ α2n0v/N + β2n1v/N (13)
Here, x−L1 and 1−x−L0 are equal to (n10+n01)/N and
(n00+n11)/N respectively so that they must be positive.
Combining these positivity constraints with the positivi-
ties inside the square roots, we have L1+|−∆+ L1α2−β2 | ≤
x ≤ 1 − L0 − | − ∆ − α2 + β2 + L0α2−β2 |. We can eas-
ily confirm that these equations are the same as equa-
tions in [9] where γ = β and the channel has no loss i.e.,
L0 = L1 = 0. Eq. (13) gives us the possible parameter
set {nerr, nph} for fixed α, γ, L0, L1, L, and nfil. By tak-
ing the optimum ratio between L0 and L1 with respect to
nph for given nerr, nfil and L, we obtain an upper bound
nph on the number of phase errors nph, as a function
of the observed values nerr, nfil and L, and the chosen
parameters α and γ.
IV. EXAMPLES AND CONCLUSION
In this section, at first we give the examples of the
phase error estimation and resulting performance of the
B92 protocol.
To illustrate the accuracy of the phase error esti-
mation and security performance of the B92 proto-
col, we assign values to the observable data as they
would arise from a depolarizing quantum channel with
loss, i.e., the state ρ evolves into L|V 〉〈V | + (1 −
L)
[
(1− p)ρ+∑i=x,y,z σiρσi], where |V 〉 is the vacuum
state, L is the loss rate of quantum channel, p is the de-
polarizing rate, and σi is the Pauli matrix. In Fig. 1,
we show the upper bound of the estimated phase error
rate, the actual phase error rate, and bit error rate for
the case (a) p = 0.01, L = 0, and (b) p = 0.01, L = 0.5.
These figures are independent of γ, since we plot the
phase error rates normalized by nfil so that the pre-factor
β2/γ2 is cancelled. In each figure, it is seen that when
|〈ϕ0|ϕ1〉|2 becomes smaller, the estimation of the phase
errors becomes poorer. On the other hand, larger values
of |〈ϕ0|ϕ1〉|2 make the signal more vulnerable to noise
and loss. Furthermore, due to the loss, the estimation in
(b) is poorer than that in (a), especially in the region for
small |〈ϕ0|ϕ1〉|2.
Since Alice and Bob apply random permutation in the
protocol, the achievable length of the final key is given
by nkey = (γ
2/β2)nfil[1−h(nbit/nfil)−h(nph/nfil)] [9, 13]
, when nph/nfil ≤ 1/2. Here h(p) ≡ −p log2 p − (1 −
p) log2(1 − p). The positivity of nkey means that Alice
and Bob generate a secure key. In Fig. 2 (a), we have nu-
merically calculated the key generation rate G ≡ nkey/N
in the case of γ = β for the fixed value of |〈ϕ0|ϕ1〉|2, L
and p, and plot G optimized over |〈ϕ0|ϕ1〉|2 as a func-
tion of p. The optimum value of |〈ϕ0|ϕ1〉|2 is shown in
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FIG. 1: The estimated phase error rate nph/nfil (dot-dashed
line), the actual phase error rate (solid line), and bit error rate
(dotted line) in case of p = 0.01. Diagram (a) is for L = 0
and (b) is for L = 0.5. We assume that quantum channel is a
depolarizing channel with loss.
Fig. 2 (b). Since the optimization of the ratio between
L0 and L1 is complicated, we have optimized the ratio
numerically. From Fig. 2 (a), it is seen that the B92 pro-
tocol as described here is secure up to p ∼ 0.034 (in the
case of L = 0), p ∼ 0.023 (in the case of L = 0.2), and
p ∼ 0.012 (in the case of L = 0.5). The use of the gen-
eral B92 measurement, i.e., γ = 1 yields the higher secret
key gain, however this does not change the cutoff of the
gain nor the optimum angle in Fig. 2 (b). This is again
because of the fact that the cutoff is determined by the
error rate normalized by nfil.
In the BB84 protocol or 6-state protocol [14], thanks
to the randomly chosen conjugate bases, phase error es-
timation is more precise than that in the B92 protocol.
The poor estimation in the B92 makes this protocol more
vulnerable to eavesdropping. Actually, it is known that
the BB84 protocol and 6-state protocol are secure up to
p ∼ 0.165 [5] and p ∼ 0.1905 [15] corresponding to bit
error rates of 11% and 12.7%, respectively.
In summary, we have shown that the security proof of
the B92 over loss-free channel [9] can be adapted to lossy
and noisy channels assuming Bob’s detector that discrim-
inates between single photon states on one hand and vac-
uum state or multi-photon states on the other hand. We
have derived the general formula for the estimation of the
phase errors from bit errors. We have also shown that
the boundary loss rate at which Eve can induce phase er-
rors freely without inducing bit errors coincides with the
case where Eve employs the optimum unambiguous state
discrimination measurement. Finally, we have shown the
examples of the security assuming the quantum channel
is the depolarizing quantum channel with loss.
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FIG. 2: (a) The optimum key generation rate G for the case
γ = β and (b) the optimum value of |〈ϕ0|ϕ1〉|
2. Here we
assume that the quantum channel is the depolarizing chan-
nel with loss. The dotted line, the dot-dashed, and solid line
represent the case where L = 0, L = 0.2, and L = 0.5 respec-
tively.
It is an interesting problem to compare our results to
the case where Eve performs only individual attack. For
the B92 with loss, the security is estimated in [16]. How-
ever in that paper, it is assumed that Alice and Bob em-
ploy error discarding protocol so that we cannot compare
our result to their result directly. We leave this problem
for future studies. Another interesting problem is to con-
sider the case where Bob’s detector is not perfect. In this
case, some filtered states may remain vacuum state or
multi-photon states so that our proof cannot be directly
applied. The security analysis of the B92 with coherent
state is another interesting problem. We hope our study
is helpful for solving these problems and we leave them
as future studies.
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